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The main mathematical symbols used in this document are defined as follows. Others may be
defined as needed within the text.
Indices
c Index of contingencies.
d Index of demands.
g Index of generating units.
` Index of transmission elements (i.e. of lines and phase shifting transformers).
`p Index of phase shifting transformers.
n Index of nodes.
Sets
Cc ⊆ C Subset of contingencies covered by the SCOPF formulation, including the pseudo-
contingency of no outage.
D Set of demands.
Dn ⊆ D Subset of demands connected at node n.
G Set of generating units.
Gn ⊆ G Subset of generating units connected at node n.
L Set of transmission elements (i.e. of lines and phase shifting transformers).
Lp ⊆ L Subset of phase shifting transformers.
N Set of nodes.
Parameters
w0 Prevailing weather (and market) conditions.
cg Marginal generation cost of generating unit g.
PMg (w0) Dispatch of generating unit g as per the market clearing.
Pmaxg Capacity of generating unit g.
Pming Minimum stable generation of unit g.
∆P−g Ramp-down limit of generating unit g in corrective mode.
∆P+g Ramp-up limit of generating unit g in corrective mode.
Pd(w0) Load active power of demand d.
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vd(w0) Value of lost load of demand d.
fmax` Long-term thermal rating of transmission element `.
r` Ratio of the short-term thermal rating to the long-term thermal rating of transmis-
sion element ` (r` ≥ 1).
X` Reactance of transmission element `.
βn,` Element of the flow incidence matrix, taking a value of one if node n is the sending
node of element `, a value of minus one if node n is the receiving node of element `,
and a zero value otherwise.
pic(w0) Probability of occurrence of contingency c.
a`,c Binary parameter taking a zero value if element {` ∈ L} is unavailable under con-
tingency c ≥ 1.
∆θmin`p Lower limit on angle of phase shifting transformer `p.
∆θmax`p Upper limit on angle of phase shifting transformer `p.
pifailg (w0) Probability of failure of an elementary corrective control operation of generating unit
g.
pifail`p (w0) Probability of failure of an elementary corrective control operation of phase shifting
transformer `p.
εRT Tolerance level of the reliability target.
M A large constant.
Continuous Variables
P+g,0 Preventive ramp-up of generating unit g.
P−g,0 Preventive ramp-down of generating unit g.
P+g,c Corrective ramp-up of generating unit g following contingency c.
P−g,c Corrective ramp-down of generating unit g following contingency c.
∆θ`p,c Corrective phase shift of transformer `p following contingency c.
f`,0 Power flowing through transmission element ` under the pre-contingency state.
fST`,c Power flowing through transmission element ` following contingency c and prior to the
application of corrective control.
f`,c Power flowing through transmission element ` following contingency c and the successful
application of corrective control.
θn,0 Voltage angle at node n under the pre-contingency state.
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θSTn,c Voltage angle at node n following contingency c and prior to the application of corrective
control.
θn,c Voltage angle at node n following contingency c and the succesful application of corrective
control.
Nb: All continuous variables are non-negative with the exception of the transmission element
flow variables, and angle variables.
Binary Variables
γg,c Auxiliary variable, taking a value of 1 if the scheduled corrective action concerning
contingency c involves an elementary operation of generator g.
λ`p,c Auxiliary variable, taking a value of 1 if the scheduled corrective action concerning
contingency c involves an elementary operation of a phase shifting transformer `p.
ζc Auxiliary variable, taking a value of 1 if, upon occurrence of contingency c, operational




This document provides supplementary material regarding the Security Constrained Optimal
Power Flow (SCOPF) formulation implemented for the purposes of the analysis presented in
section IV of [1]. More specifically, section 2 recalls the compact statement of the probabilistic
RMAC proposed in [1] and presents an overview of this implementation. Section 3 presents
the corresponding detailed mathematical formulation while section 4 concludes by presenting
additional data on the RTS-96 [2] system used in the case studies.
2 Mathematical modeling overview
Let us recall from section II.C of [1] the following compact statement of the proposed RT-RMAC.
min
u∈U(x0)




CC (xc, uc, w0) +
∑
b∈B




(x0, xc, xbc)∈Xa|(c, b)∈Cc × B
}
≥ (1− εRT ) (7)
while
RC\Cc(u) ≤ ∆ERT . (8)
where,
x0 Pre-contingency operating state.
xc Short-term steady-state reached after the occurrence of any contingency c ∈
Cc and before the application of the respective corrective control action (if
any).
xbc Steady-state reached after the occurrence of any contingency c ∈ Cc and the
realization of corrective control behavior b ∈ B.
Xa Set of acceptable trajectories, i.e. implying an acceptable level of service to
the system end-users.
u ∈ U(x0) A joint preventive/corrective control strategy consisting of a preventive con-
trol decision u0 ∈ U0(x0) and a set of corrective control decisions {uc ∈
Uc(x0, u0, c), ∀c ∈ C}.
CP (x0, u0, w0) Preventive control cost function.
CC (xc, uc, w0) Corrective control cost function.
S(xbc(u0, uc), w0) Severity function.
RC\Cc(u) Residual risk associated to the contingencies c ∈ C \ Cc for reliability man-
agement strategy u ∈ U(x0).
∆ERT Accuracy threshold.
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We focus here on the mathematical model used for the implementation of the SCOPF prob-
lem (6-7) in the case studies presented in section IV of [1]. Prior to presenting the detailed
mathematical formulation and relevant data, we briefly introduce the following approximations
used in our implementation:
a.) We employ the DC power flow approximation [3] to express all network constraints.
b.) We model an “acceptable system trajectory”, denoted as (x0, xc, xbc)∈Xa in (7), as the exis-
tence of a steady-state equilibrium with no loss of load throughout: (i) the pre-contingency
operation, (ii) the short-term interval after the occurrence of any contingency c ∈ Cc and
before the application of the respective corrective control actions, and, (iii) the final state
reached by following the application of corrective control actions while taking into account
their possible failures. It follows that any case under which the mathematical constraints
expressing the system operational limits would be violated for at least one of these three
regimes is regarded in our implementation as an “unaccaptable system trajectory”.
c.) To model the possible failure of corrective control actions, we assume that any elementary
control operation may either work or fail. Moreover, we also assume that the failure of
any such elementary operation also implies the complete failure of the respective action.
Exploiting the fact that, in a cost-minimization setting corrective actions of non-negative
cost would only be employed if needed to enforce a post-contingency operational limit, we
deduce that any failure of corrective control results in an “unacceptable system trajectory”.
d.) Rather than modeling, within the limited scope of the static DC power flow approximation,
the potential evolution of the system following any such violation of operational limits, we
employ the pessimistic, yet conservative approximation that the violation of the aforemen-
tioned limits results in the loss of the total system load. Accordingly, we consider that
an “unacceptable system trajectory” implies a severity value equal to the scalar product of
the value of lost load and load demand, i.e. the maximum socio-economic cost of service
interruption for the time period in question.
3 Detailed mathematical formulation
This section presents the detailed mathematical formulation of the proposed RT-RMAC, as
approximated in the framework of a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem. In
order to gradually build our implementation, we begin in subsection 3.1 with the model of
the pre-contingency operation of the system. Subsection 3.2 refers to the short-term post-
contingency state before the application of any corrective action, while subsection 3.3 concerns
the application of corrective control. We derive the chance constraint expressing the reliability
target (7) in subsection 3.4 while subsection 3.5 completes the mathematical statement of the
problem in question by presenting the analytical statement of objective function (6).
In the following sections, all numbered equations from (9) to (38) are composing the joint
SCOPF problem formulation; auxiliary equations used for explanatory purposes are therefore
not numbered.
3.1 Preventive operation
The pre-contingency operation is mathematically modeled in our implementation by means of
constraints (9-14). Bounds on preventive active power generation rescheduling are shown in
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(9-10) while (11 - 14) are standard expressions of the DC power flow approximation. The nodal
power balance is expressed as in (11), while (12) expresses the power flowing through each
transmission element of the network. Finally (13 - 14) enforce the long-term thermal ratings of
transmission elements.
∀g ∈ G :
0 ≤ P−g,0 ≤ PMg (w0)− Pming (9)
0 ≤ P+g,0 ≤ Pmaxg − PMg (w0). (10)



















βn,` · θn,0 = 0 (12)
f`,0 ≤ fmax` (13)
− f`,0 ≤ fmax` . (14)
3.2 Short-term post-contingency states
We express the constraints corresponding to the viability of the short-term steady-state reached
after the occurrence of any contingency c ∈ Cc and before the application of the respective
corrective control action (if any) as shown in (15 - 20).
Prior to explaining these constraints, let us recall that in our formulation short-term post-
contingency steady-states are not required to be viable for each and every contingency, but
rather that the reliability target (7) needs to be satisfied globally over the whole set of covered
contingencies Cc. Hence, the formulation allows to relax short-term post-contingency constraints
for some contingencies provided that this is at the same time compliant with (7) and beneficial
from the point of view of the objective function. In order to enable this feature, we use in
our implementation, for each c ∈ Cc, an auxiliary binary variable (ζc) taking a value of one if
for that contingency the respective short-term operational limits are chosen to be relaxed (and
such a relaxation will be accounted in (7) and in the cost function (6) as implying indeed an
“unacceptable system trajectory” for these contingencies).
Therefore, inequalities (16 - 17) jointly enforce the nodal power balance constraint only for
the value of ζc = 0. Likewise, the short-term thermal ratings of transmission elements (19 - 20)
are only restrictive when ζc = 0.
∀c ∈ Cc :
ζc ∈ {0; 1}. (15)






























∀c ∈ Cc, ∀` ∈ L :





βn,` · θSTn,c = 0 (18)
fST`,c − a`,c · (r` · fmax` + ζc ·M) ≤ 0 (19)
− fST`,c − a`,c · (r` · fmax` + ζc ·M) ≤ 0. (20)
3.3 Corrective control and its possible failure
We consider the application of corrective actions, only under the condition that the short-
term post-contingency state meets the respective limits. To mathematically express such a
requirement, in our implementation we use the set of constraints (21-30). Firstly, notice that
from (15, 21 - 22) and (15, 27 - 28) a value of ζc = 1 would restrict auxiliary binary variables
(γg,c ∀g ∈ G) and
(
λ`p,c ∀`p ∈ Lp
)
respectively to zero. The corrective control of generating
units is restricted by (23-26) within applicable limits and only under the condition that γg,c = 1.
Likewise, (29-30) restrict the angle of phase shifting transformers within the respective minimum
and maximum limits while λ`p,c = 1, conversely this angle is also bounded to zero, thus restricting
the corrective control of phase-shifting transformers.
∀c ∈ Cc,∀g ∈ G :
γg,c ∈ {0; 1} (21)
γg,c + ζc ≤ 1 (22)
P−g,0 + P−g,c ≤ PMg (w0)− Pming (23)
P+g,0 + P+g,c ≤ Pmaxg − PMg (w0) (24)
0 ≤ P+g,c ≤ γg,c ·∆P+g (25)
0 ≤ P−g,c ≤ γg,c ·∆P−g . (26)
∀c ∈ Cc,∀`p ∈ Lp :
λ`p,c ∈ {0; 1} (27)
λ`p,c + ζc ≤ 1 (28)
−∆θ`p,c + λ`p,c ·∆θmin`p ≤ 0 (29)
∆θ`p,c − λ`p,c ·∆θmax`p ≤ 0. (30)
Similarly, to express the equilibrium state following the successful application of corrective
control, we use the constraints of the DC power flow approximation only under the condition
that the value of auxiliary binary variable ζc is equal to zero. Indeed, if this value is non-zero,
there is no feasible transition from the pre-contingency operating state to a state following the
successful application of corrective control. In mathematical terms, the corresponding set of
constraints is (31-36).






































∀c ∈ Cc, ∀`p ∈ Lp :





βn,`p · θn,c + ∆θ`p,c
 = 0. (33)
∀c ∈ Cc, ∀` ∈ L \ Lp :




βn,` · θn,c = 0. (34)
∀c ∈ Cc, ∀` ∈ L :
f`,c − a`,c · (1− ζc) · fmax` ≤ 0 (35)
− f`,c − a`,c · (1− ζc) · fmax` ≤ 0. (36)
Let us finally underline here that, as explained in section 2 of this document, in our im-
plementation the failure of any elementary control operation implies that constraints (31 - 36)
would be violated for the respective contingency. Indeed, let us first notice that all such con-
straints are expressed per contingency. Furthermore, recalling that any corrective action implies
(i) a non-negative cost of application and (ii) a non-negative socio-economic cost attached to
it’s possible failure, in a cost minimization framework, contingency specific corrective actions
would optimally be selected so as to make at least one of (31 - 36) binding. Hence, under
the assumption of failure of any such corrective control action, at least one of the constraints
(31 - 36) would be violated and the respective system trajectory should be indeed regarded as
“unacceptable”.
3.4 The reliability target (7)
Let us firstly recall from subsection 3.2 that, for any contingency c ∈ Cc a value of ζc = 1 implies
an unacceptable system trajectory due to the inability to reach a short-term post-contingency
equilibrium. It follows that the probability of realizing such a kind of unacceptable trajectory,




where p˜ic(w0) = pic(w0)/
∑
c∈Cc pic(w0).
On the other hand, as explained in subsection 3.3 any potential failure of corrective control
also implies an “unacceptable system trajectory”. In our implementation, we assume that the
failure probability of any corrective control action is equal to the sum of the failure probabilities
of all concerned elementary control operations. Recalling, that for any contingency c ∈ Cc ele-
mentary control operations on generating units (g ∈ G) and phase shifting transformers (`p ∈ Lp)
would be indicated by auxiliary binary variables γg,c = 1 and λ`p,c = 1 respectively, the condi-
tional probability of corrective control failure is hence mathematically expressed as follows,∑
g∈G
pifailg (w0) · γg,c +
∑
`p∈Lp
pifail`p (w0) · λ`p,c ∀c ∈ Cc.




p˜ic(w0) · ζc +
∑
c∈Cc
p˜ic(w0) · (1− ζc) ·
∑
g∈G
pifailg (w0) · γg,c +
∑
`p∈Lp
pifail`p (w0) · λ`p,c
 ≤ εRT .
Noticing that whenever ζc = 1 we also have ∀g ∈ G : γg,c = 0 (given (22)) and ∀`p ∈ Lp : λ`p,c = 0
(given (28)), this latter equation is equivalent to the following one:∑
c∈Cc






pifailg (w0) · γg,c +
∑
`p∈Lp
pifail`p (w0) · λ`p,c
 ≤ εRT . (37)
3.5 Objective function (6)
Concluding, the objective function of the proposed RT-RMAC is implemented as shown in (38).
In the first row of (38) the first term corresponds to the costs of the preventive generation
re-dispatch with respect to the market clearing outcome, while the second term expresses the
expected cost of corrective control. The latter is computed here as the probability weighted
summation of the ramp-up costs with respect to the pre-contingency generation dispatch. In
the second row of this function, we multiply the probability of violating the system operational
limits by the scalar product of the value of lost load and the load demand. As already introduced,
under the conservative assumption that any violation of the system operational limits would lead
to the loss of the whole system load, and since with our model any acceptable trajectory always




















pifailg (w0) · γg,c +
∑
`p∈Lp





4 Data used in the case studies
This section provides additional detailed data used in the case studies presented in section IV
of [1]. Notice that the data not presented here can be found in [1] and/or [2].
4.1 Generation Data
Table 1 provides an overview of the generation data. The first four columns of this table show,
for each generating unit g ∈ G, the maximum active power generation for each one of the four
segments of the assumed piece-wise linear generation cost function. Notice that this data are
also listed on the fifth column of table 9 in [2]. The last four columns of table 1 list the marginal
generation cost per segment of the assumed piecewise linear generation cost function. This data
have been computed as in [4], i.e. using the incremental heat rates presented in the last column




g (MW ) ckg ($/MWh)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 – 4 15.8 0.2 3.8 0.2 47.705 49.060 69.058 69.808
5 – 8 15.8 0.2 3.8 0.2 47.705 49.060 69.058 69.808
9 – 11 25 25 30 20 30.008 32.304 34.945 36.640
12 – 14 68.95 49.25 39.4 39.4 30.968 32.768 34.222 35.687
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 – 20 2.4 3.6 3.6 2.4 37.761 38.321 43.285 49.038
21 – 22 54.25 38.75 31 31 15.997 16.531 17.226 18.157
23 – 24 100 100 120 80 8.563 8.676 8.913 9.134
25 – 30 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 – 32 54.25 38.75 31 31 15.997 16.531 17.226 18.157
33 140 87.5 52.5 70 16.262 17.218 17.892 18.906
Table 1: Generation data
4.2 Demand data
The demand data are summarized in table 2. The first two columns of this table show the active
power load of each demand d ∈ D. As mentioned in [1], the listed values for Cases A and B
correspond to to the 1-hour interval [12:00;13:00) on the Monday of week 23 (summer) and week
46 (winter) respectively for an annual peak load of 3000MW, as per tables 2,3,4 and 5 of [2].
The last two columns of table 2 present the assumed value of lost load for any demand d ∈ D.
The data referring to Case A have been found in [6]. Concerning Case B the listed data have
been computed under the assumption that, due to adverse weather conditions, the voll of each
demand is increased by 15%.
4.3 Outage probability data
Table 3 shows the outage probability data. Notice that for the sake of readability all
values listed in this table have been multiplied by 105. The values corresponding to Case
A have been computed according to the permanent outage rates shown in table 12 of [2] for a
time interval of 1 hour, as per the methodology developed in [7]. As suggested in [2], we used
a frequency of 7.5 % to compute the outage rates for common mode outages on circuits that
share a common right of way only. Concerning Case B, we have arbitrarily assumed that, due
to adverse weather condition, forced outage rates are increased by 10% on all branches, with the
exception of the cables [A1;A10]. Finally, in both cases, the probability of no outage (denoted
as c0) is computed as 1−∑c∈C\c0 pic(w0), i.e. by assuming that the set of mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive events for the time interval of interest includes only the outages listed in
table 3 and the pseudo-contingency of no outage. Accordingly, the probability of realizing no
outage is found to be equal to [0.9985,0.9981] in Case A,B respectively.
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d Pd(w0) (MW ) vd(w0) ($/MWh)
Case A Case B Case A Case B
1 95.418 96.476 6200 7130
2 85.374 86.320 4890 5623.5
3 158.193 159.947 5300 6095
4 65.286 66.010 5620 6463
5 62.775 63.471 6110 7026.5
6 120.528 121.864 5500 6325
7 110.484 111.709 5410 6221.5
8 150.660 152.330 5400 6210
9 153.171 154.869 2300 2645
10 170.748 172.641 4140 4761
11 233.523 236.112 5390 6198.5
12 170.748 172.641 3410 3921.5
13 276.210 279.272 3010 3461.5
14 87.885 88.859 3540 4071
15 293.787 297.044 3750 4312.5
16 160.704 162.486 2290 2633.5
17 112.995 114.248 3640 4186
Table 2: Demand data
4.4 Phase shifting transformers
We have modified the standard version of the RTS-96 by assuming that the four transformers
linking buses 9,10,11 and 12 (i.e. branches A14 – A17) are replaced by phase shifting trans-
formers. The upper/lower bounds on the phase angle of all such devices is set to ±10◦ in the
case studies.
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Outage Case A Case B Outage Case A Case B
A1 2.74 2.74 A24 3.76 4.70
A2 5.81 7.27 A25-1 4.67 5.84
A3 3.76 4.70 A25-2 4.67 5.84
A4 4.45 5.56 A26 4.67 5.84
A5 5.47 6.84 A27 3.99 4.99
A6 4.33 5.41 A28 3.88 4.84
A7 0.23 0.28 A29 3.65 4.56
A8 4.10 5.13 A30 6.16 7.69
A9 3.88 4.84 A31-1 3.99 4.99
A10 3.76 3.76 A31-2 3.99 4.99
A11 3.42 4.27 A32-1 4.33 5.41
A12-1 5.02 6.27 A32-2 4.33 5.41
A13-2 5.02 6.27 A33-1 3.88 4.84
A14 0.23 0.28 A33-2 3.88 4.84
A15 0.23 0.28 A34 5.13 6.41
A16 0.23 0.28 A12-1,A12-2 0.38 0.47
A17 0.23 0.28 A18,A20 0.34 0.43
A18 4.56 5.70 A25-1,A25-2 0.35 0.44
A19 4.45 5.56 A30,A34 0.46 0.58
A20 4.56 5.70 A31-1,A31-2 0.30 0.37
A21 5.93 7.41 A32-1,A32-2 0.32 0.41
A22 5.59 6.98 A33-1,A33-2 0.29 0.36
A23 4.33 5.41
Table 3: Outage probability data (×105)
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